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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WYCOFF
ATED,

COMPANY,

INCORPOR-

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, DONALD HACKING and RAYMOND W.
GEE, ITS COMMISSIONERS,

9915

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a Declaratory Judgment action that seeks to
have declared unconstitutional the Utah Motor Carrier Act
(Chapter 6, Title 54, Utah Code Annotated 1953) and all
of the Public Utilities Act (Title 54, Utah Code Annotated
1953), to the extent that the provisions of the latter act
relate to the regulation or control of motor carriers, on the
basis that the provisions and requirements of said Acts,
and the exemptions provided in Section 54-6-12, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, are repugnant to Article I, Sections 2, 7
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and 24 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States of America.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
Most of the facts pertaining to methods of regulation
by the Public Service Commission were stipulated. No testimony was taken and the matter was submitted after the
filing of written briefs and oral argument by counsel. The
trial court found the issues in favor of respondent, based
upon the following Conclusions of Law (R. 100):
"That the exclusion provisions of the statute
which, as set out in Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, exempt from general application of
the Act and from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission (except as to requirements of insurance, safety regulations and accident reports),
those motor carriers engaged in transportation for
non-profit agriculture associations; or those motor
carriers transporting, for hire, farm, orchard, or
dairy products; livestock, farm, or dairy supplies
used on or about farms or dairies; coal, lumber, logs,
newspapers, money or valuables, are discriminatory
and deny to those carriers brought within the Act
in all particulars, the equal protection of the laws
as guaranteed by Amendments XIV of the Constitution of the United States of America, and Article
I, Section 7, of the Constitution of the State of
Utah."
The judgment of the court was as follows (R. 102103) :
"It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed
that Title 54, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
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as amended, is hereby declared to be in violation of
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United
States of America and Article I, Section 7, of the
Constitution of the State of Utah, and that said
Title 54, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, is unconstitutional and void."
The court's attention is directed to the fact that the
above judgment is limited to declaring Title 54, Chapter
6 (the 1\Iotor Carrier Act) unconstitutional, and that Title
64 (the Public Utilities Act), insofar as its provisions relate to the regulation of motor carriers, was not declared
unconstitutional.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to vacate the Finding of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and the Judgment, of the court below,
and to have this matter reversed in favor of the appellants
and against respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are limited, as the issue is primarily one of law.
Respondent is a common motor carrier of property,
operating in the State of Utah pursuant to various certificates of convenience and necessity issued by the Public
Service Commission of Utah (R. 44-45). Since the commencement of this action, respondent has made application
to the Public Service Commission of Utah for at least one
additional certificate of convenience and necessity ( R. 86) .
Respondent alleges in paragraph 7 of its complaint, as
follows (R. 3) :
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"That the defendants have threatened to require plaintiff to pay substantial penalties and have
caused criminal citations to be issued against plaintiff, and plaintiff'ss employees, the proceedings under some of which are still pending, for plaintiff's
alleged failure to comply with the requirements of
Title 54, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953."
At the time respondent filed its complaint in this matter, there was pending before the Supreme Court of Utah
the case of Wycoff Company, Incorporated v. Public Service Commission of Utah, et al., 13 Utah (2d) 123, 369
Pac. (2d) 283. The decision of the Supreme Court on
March 1, 1962, affirmed the penalty assessed against respondent by the Public Service Commission in the amount
of $18,500.00 for violations of the Motor Carrier Act. The
penalties were imposed pursuant to Sec. 54-7-25, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, part of the Public Utilities Act not the
Motor Carrier Act. There is presently pending before the
District Court for Salt Lake County, case, Civil No. 140087,
State of Utah v. Wycoff Company, Incorporated, which action was instituted to recover the aforesaid penalty of $18500.00 from Wycoff. A judgment in favor of the State of
Utah was rendered April 10, 1963. On June 21, 1963, an
order was issued by said District Court, suspending any
further proceedings in said case until the constitutionality
of the Motor Carrier Act is resolved by this court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED TO QUESTION
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UTAH
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l\IOTOR CARRIER ACT (CHAPTER 6, TITLE
54, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953).
Respondent Wycoff has for many years been engaged
in business as a common motor carrier of property, holding certificates of convenience and necessity to engage in
the transportation of property for hire in Utah commerce,
and during the pendency of this action, has petitioned the
Public Service Commission of Utah for an enlargement or
extension of its authority to engage in the transportation of
property in intrastate commerce (R. 86). During this time,
respondent has enjoyed the benefits a motor carrier derives
from being the holder of certificates of convenience and
necessity and did not choose to challenge the constitutionality of the Utah Motor Carrier Act, or the Public Utilities
Act, as it pertains to motor carriers, until the filing of this
action.
Apparently this action was commenced as a result of
the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of respondent's
complaint, which states: "That the defendants have threatened to require Plaintiff to pay substantial penalties and
have caused criminal citations to be issued against plaintiff, and plaintiff's employees, the proceedings under some
of which are still pending, for plaintiff's alleged failure to
comply with the requirements of Title 54, Chapter 6, Utah
Code Annotated 1953" (R. 3). With respect to the extent
that respondent was adversely affected by such action, the
Supreme Court of Utah laid the matter at rest on March 1,
19l)~. when it decided the case of Wycoff Co., Inc. v. Public
St'n·ice Commission of Utah, et al., supra, upholding the im-
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position of a penalty of $18,500.00 against the carrier for
violations of its authority, and sustaining the validity of
the statutes under which such action was taken.
The position of appellants is that respondent is estopped to question the constitutionality of the Utah Motor
Carrier Act on the basis that one who retains and enjoys
the benefits of a law may not attack its constitutionality.
It is a well recognized rule in constitutional law that

one who accepts benefits under a statute may be estopped
from questioning the constitutionality of the statute. This
principle is stated as follows in the case of Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 91 L. Ed 2031:

"* * * It is an elementary rule of constitutional law that one may not 'retain the benefits of
the Act while attacking the constitutionality of one
of its important conditions.' United States v. San
Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29, 84 L. Ed. 1050, 1059,
60 S. Ct. 749. As formulated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 348, 80 L. Ed. 688, 711,
56 S. Ct. 466, 'The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who
has availed himself of its benefits.'"
There are exceptions to the rule, however, and it appears that the courts are not in complete agreement. The
situation is described thusly in the summary of a complete
annotation on this subject in 65 A. L. R. (2d) 664:
"It is not possible to derive, from the cases
discussed in this annotation, a flat or uniform rule
governing the question whether a person is, by applying for or securing a professional or occu~a
tional license, precluded from attacking the vahd-
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ity of the licensing law, or any of its parts, or an
administrative regulation issued thereunder. The
question ordinarily depends upon the circumstances
of th(' individual case.

·•As regards the nature of the proceeding in
which an attack on the constitutionality of a licensing law, or part thereof, is made, the authorities
seem in agreement that such an attack cannot be
made in proceedings to obtain the license, except as
to specific provisions which prevent the applicant
from obtaining the license. Most cases hold that a
person who obtains a license cannot afterward question the constitutionality of the licensing law when
the license is sought to be revoked. But there are
cases upholding such an attack even in proceedings
related to revocation. It seems that the rule of estoppel or waiver does not apply in a criminal or
civil proceeding for acting without a license. But
it cannot be said that in civil actions between private parties the rule of waiver or estoppel never
applies; the rule has been uniformly applied in actions on a licensee's bond.
"Apart from the circumstances of individual
cases, there is a cleavage in the court's fundamental
approach to the question under annotation. Some of
the courts, in holding that an attack was not permissible, have emphasized that the application for
the license was the voluntary act of the litigant,
while other courts, in reaching the opposite result
as to the permissibility of the attack, have emphasized that in view of the penalties prescribed in the
licensing law for acting without license, the application for the license was not the voluntary act of
the litigant." (Emphasis added.)
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In 1957 this court had a somewhat analogous situation
before it in the case of Salt Lake City Lines v. Salt Lake
City, 6 U. 2d 428, 315 P. 2d 859. To refresh the court's
memory of the facts of that case, they are summarized in
the syllabus as follows: "The Supreme Court, Henriod, J.,
held that where transportation company for six years accepted all terms of ordinance which permitted it to operate
a mass transportation system by rail, bus, or other systems,
and required company to pay license tax, company's conduct constituted an acceptance of ordinance and company
could not attack validity of ordinance, even though company had not filed acceptance within 30 days after ordinance was passed and ordinance provided that failure to file
would render ordinance null and void."
In its decision in the Salt Lake City Lines case, this
court cited with approval the principle set down in Fahey
v. Mallonee, supra, when it said:
"All of the contentions mentioned seem to be
vulnerable to the general proposition that one accepting the benefits of legislation, ordinarily is
speeechless in denouncing its validity, even on constitutional grounds. * * *"
Another frequently cited case, St. Louis Public Service
Co., a corp., v. The City of St. Louis, et al., (Mo.), 302 S.
W. 2d 875, states the rule as follows:
"The rule is well settled that one voluntarily
proceeding under a statute or ordinance, and claiming benefits thereby conferred, will not be heard to
question its validity in order to avoid it~ bu.rde~~·
The same or similar rules have been apphed m litigation involving many different types of instru-
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ments, licenses, or other transactions. The designation used in referring to this rule or doctrine is obviously unimportant. It is frequently called an estoppel. However, it is akin to the rule against assuming inconsistent positions and it involves the
principles of waiver, election, and ratification
rather, perhaps, than being limited to the precise
principles of equitable estoppel. Regardless of the
name or principle designated, the result is clearly
the same. It precludes one who accepts the benefits
from questioning the validity of the accompanying
obligation. * * *"
See also Neel v. Texas Liquor Control Board (Texas),
259 S. W. 2d 312; Crittenden County v. McConnell (Ky.),
36 S. W. 2d 627; American Board and Mortgage Company
v. United States, 52 F. 2d 318; and Gregory v. Heeke,
(Calif.), 238 Pac. 787.
In Cotman v. Ousterhous, 40 N. D. 390, 168 N. W. 826,
the court said :
"Nor in any event, can the relator question the
right of the dairy commissioner to cancel the license
on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the act,
and that his business was such that could not be
constitutionally licensed. It is clear, indeed, that a
person who obtains a license under a law, and seeks
for a time to enjoy the benefits thereof, cannot afterward question the constitutionality of the act
when the license is sought to be revoked. Minneapolis, St. P. & S., Ste. M. R. Co. v. Nester, 3 N. D.
480, 47 N. W. 510; Hart v. Folsom, 70 H. H. 213, 47
Atl. 603; State v. Seebold, 192 Mo. 720, 91 S. W.
491; note in 19 Ann. Cas. 183."
\Yhile it is true that in some instances the courts have
not recognized the doctrine of estoppel on the basis that a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
person acquiring a license does not do so voluntarily because he would be severely penalized if he operated without a license, such reasoning is not in accord with the facts
of life today. At one time, few professions or occupations
required a license, but today there is scarcely a trade or
occupation, with any type of public interest, that isn't subject to licensing and regulation-lawyers, doctors, contractors, architects, barbers, beauty parlors, and public utilities, just to name a few. It would be specious thinking to
say that the acquisition of a license to engage in these businesses and occupations is the involuntary act of the applicants. Today it is well recognized that most licensed businesses and occupations require certain qualifications or
skills and that licensees receive benefits from being licensed.
In the instant case, respondent maintains an inconsistent position. For years, respondent has enjoyed the
benefits of the Motor Carrier Act, and while this very action was pending, continued to seek additional authority to
operate under the law. By virtue of the circumstances of
this case, and the case law and texts heretofore cited, appellants submit that respondent is estopped to challenge the
constitutionality of the Utah Motor Carrier Act.
POINT II.
A PARTY MAY NOT CLAIM THE INVALIDITY OF A STATUTE UNLESS SUCH PARTY
IS HARMFULLY AFFECTED BY THE PARTICULAR FEATURES OF THE STATUTE.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
In 16 Corpus Juris Secundum, Constitutional Law, Section 76, it is stated, in part:
.. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a
statute or other governmental action is to be considered in the light of the standing of the party who
seeks to raise the question and of its particular application. It is a firmly established principle of law
that the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance
may not be attacked by one whose rights are not,
or are not about to be, adversely affected by the
operation of the statute. This rule applies to all
cases both at law and in equity, and is equally applicable in both civil and criminal proceedings. One
of the many variations of this rule is the principle
that one may not urge the unconstitutionality of a
statute who is not harmfully affected by the particular feature of the statute alleged to be in conflict
with the constitution."

In this connection, see Tilleston v. Ullman, 318 U. S.
44; J<'tfrey Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571;
State V. Heitz (Idaho), 238 Pac. (2d) 439; Pugh v. Pugh,
1~4 N. \V. 959.
In Bode, et al. v. Barrett, et al., 344 U. S. 583, 97 L.
Ed. 567, the rule was stated as follows :

"* * * Appellants make other arguments
to the effect that the statute is so inconsistent,
vague, and uncertain in its classification as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But even if we assume that the vagaries of the law reach that dignity, no showing is
made that any of the appellants is the victim of an
invidious classification."
See also Utah Poll'er & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165.
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In what way do the exemptions in the statutes harm
respondent? Respondent may haul the cargoes exempted
under Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, if
it so desires. The only harm indicated by respondent is
that it may be subject to penalties under the Public Utility
Act, which Act is not before the court. It seems to appellants that the Act would be meaningless if it couldn't be
enforced. As stated before, this court settled the matter
with respect to penalties against respondent in the case of
Wycoff Company, Incorporated V. Public Service Commission of Utah, et al., supra.
POINT III.
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 54-6-12, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, DO
NOT DENY RESPONDENT DUE PROCESS
OR EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
It is a well settled rule that when the constitutionality
of an act of the Legislature is under consideration, there
is a strong presumption that the act is constitutional. The
Utah Supreme Court stated the rule as follows in the case
of Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530:
"In approaching the subject we have in mind
the rule that when an act of the Legislature is attacked on grounds of unconstitutionality the question presented is not whether it is possible to condemn the act but whether it is possible to uphold
it. The pres;n1ption is always in favor of validity,
and legislative enactments must be sustained unless
clearly in violation of fundamental law. Wadsworth
v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P. 2d 161. Every
presumption will be indulged in favor of legislation
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and only clear and demonstrable usurpation of
power will authorize judicial interference with legislative action."
It is also a well established rule that a person attacking
the validity of a legislative enactment has the burden of

substantiating his claim. The rule is stated as follows in
11 Am. Jur. 796:
"With regard to the duties cast upon the assailant of a legislative enactment, the rule is fixed
that a party who alleges the unconstitutionality of
a statute normally has the burden of substantiating
his claim and must overcome the strong presumption in favor of its validity. It has been said that
the party who wishes to pronounce a law unconstitutional takes on himself the burden of proving this
conclusion beyond all doubt, and that a party who
asserts that the legislature has usurped power or
has violated the Constitution must affirmatively and
clearly establish his position. * * *"
This court recognized the rule in Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 12 Utah 357, 366 P. 2d 974, saying:

"* * * We recognize as correct the rule as
stated in 12 American Jurisprudence 216 and 217,
Sec. 521, as follows :
"'One who assails the classification in a law
must carry the burden of showing that it does not
rest on any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. * * *

" '* * * Before a court can interfere with
the legislative judgment, it must be able to say that
there is no fair reason for the law that would not
require with equal force its extension to others
whom it leaves untouched. * * *' "
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In this case, respondent assails the constitutionality of
the Utah Motor Carrier Act and the Public Utilities Act,
insofar as it relates to the regulation of motor carriers, on
the basis that Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
exempts certain classes of motor vehicles from the need to
obtain certificates of convenience and necessity and from
complying with the tariff provision of the Utah Public Service Commission, thereby violating Amendment XIV of the
Constitution of the United States of America and Article I,
Sections 2, 7 and 24 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
The court below limited its judgment to declaring Title 54,
Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (the
Motor Carrier Act), unconstitutional (R. 102).
For the convenience of the court, Section 54-6-12, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, is set out below, with emphasis supplied to mark the exemptions :
"Except for the provisions of 54-6-17 relative
to requirements of insurance, 54-6-21 relative to
safety regulations, and 54-6-22 relative to accident
report no portion of this act shall apply:
" (a) To motor vehicles when engaged exclusively in transporting students or their instructors to or from school or to or from school activities,
the word 'school' to be construed to mean a place or
structure in which the annual winter or summer
elementary, collegiate, university or religious instruction is carried on; or
" (b) To motor vehicles when used exclusively
in carrying the United States mail under contract
with the federal government; or
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(c) To motor vehicles when the cargo consists exclusively of livestock, farm, orchard, or dairy
products which are being transported between farm,
orchard or dairy and a market, warehouse, creamery or processing plant; or exclusively of farm or
dairy supplies used in or about the farm or dairy;
or exclusively of coal, lumber or logs which are being transported from mine or forest to shipping
point or market; or
11

(d) To motor vehicles when owned or operated by any duly organized agriculture cooperative
association and used exclusively in the carrying on
of its legally authorized nonprofit activities; or
11

•

"(e) To motor vehicles used exclusively in the
distribution of newspapers from the publisher to
subscribers or distributors; or
"(f) To motor vehicles when especially constructed for towing, wrecking, maintenance, or repair purposes, and not otherwise used in transporting goods and merchandise for compensation; or
when constructed as armored cars and used for the
safe conveyance or delivery of money or other valuables, or when used as hearses, ambulances, or licensed taxicabs, operating within a fifteen mile
radius of the ilmits of any city or town; or to motor
vehicles used as ambulances or hearses by any person, firm or corporation duly licensed in the state
as an embalmer, funeral director, or as a mortuary
establishment, provided that use of such motor vehicles as an ambulance shall be incidental to the use
of embalming or funeral directing.
"(g) To a group of employees riding together
in the automobile of a fellow employee to and from
their employment and sharing the actual expenses
of the transportation; provided that said group of
employees shall not exceed 5 persons, in addition to
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the driver of the vehicle, and in no event to exceed
3 persons in any one seat, and provided further that
this subsection shall not apply to any individual so
operating in excess of one motor vehicle.
"It shall be unlawful for any vehicle which is
operated under any of said exempt classes to be
operated upon the public highways of this state, for
hire, without a public liability policy in an amount
not less than $20,000.00 for personal injuries to or
death of one person, or less than $40,000.80 for injuries to or death of more than one person; and for
damage to property of any person other than the
assured in an amount not less than $10,000.00 for
liability arising out of the operation of said vehicle
for hire; without maintaining said vehicle and all
parts thereof in a safe condition at all times and
without reporting every accident arising from or
in connection with the operation of such vehicle as
required by law or to be operated for any uses or
purposes not falling within said exempt classes, except in accordance with the provisions of this act.

"The commission shall have power and authority to prescribe such reasonable rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of this act as may
be deemed necessary including the establishing of
reasonable fees for registration and each annual
renewal thereof of exempt carriers and for the services performed by the commission.
"The commission is vested with power and
authority and it shall be its duty to supervise and
regulate all motor carriers as excepted above in ~c
cordance with these rules and regulations and with
the provisions of this section and all carriers now
operating under the provisions of this sect~on sh.all
make application to register their operatiOn With
the public service commission on or before July 1,
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19i>7, and thereafter each carrier commencing operations under this section shall apply for registration as provided herein within 30 days immediately
after said operation.
''A violation of this section or of the rules established pursuant thereto shall constitute an unlawful act and shall be punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as provided for in this
act for non-exempt carriers."
In examining the record of this case, we fail to find
any evidence wherein the respondent has affirmatively
demonstrated the unreasonableness of the exemptions provided for in Section 54-6-12, except, perhaps, the bald
statement in his memorandum to the court below, which
reads as follows :
''What reasonable basis can exist to require
general regulation of the transportation of sand
and gravel, oil and ore, but exclude coal, lumber or
logs; to regulate cancelled checks, but to exclude
money and other valuables; to regulate trucks hauling newspapers and any other commodity, but not
if it is the exclusive item; and numerous other illustrations that the exclusionary provisions of Title
54 readily bring to mind" (R. 54).
The Legislature undoubtedly had good reasons for exempting certain industries from general regulation. The
laws of many states provide exemptions similar to those
in the Utah law and the cases in which the exemptions have
been considered by the courts amply illustrate the valid
reasons for providing exemptions. In this connection, the
court's attention is directed to the excellent annotation in
109 A. L. R. 550. We submit that the respondent has not
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met the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the unreasonableness of the exemptions in Section 54-6-12 by
merely asking the question as to what reasonable basis can
exist for the exemptions.
Respondent, in his memorandum to the court below
states that he relies on the following authorities to sustain'
his contention that the Utah Motor Carrier Act is unconstitutional:

Newman v. Public Service Commission, Civil No.
92815, decided by the Third District Court, State of Utah,
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppsen, Judge, on February 26, 1953.
1.

2.

Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 75 L. Ed. 1264.

3. Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 12 Utah 2d 357,
366 P. 2d 974.
InN ewman v. Public Service Commission, Judge Jeppson held unconstitutional the Utah Motor Carrier Act and
the Public Utilities Act, insofar as its provisions relate to
the regulation or control of motor carriers. The court's
attention is called to the fact that this decision was made
in 1953 and that several amendments to Section 54-6-12,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, have been made since the decision.
In the recent Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Company
case, the Utah Supreme Court held that the statute imposing penalties on employers for failure to pay wages due
separated employees within 24 hours from demand therefor, was unconstitutional in its arbitrary exclusion of banks
and mercantile houses from its provision. It is interesting
to note that, although the court found the exemption of
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banks and mercantile houses to be arbitrary, the decision
was limited in its effect, the court saying:

"* * * So we conclude that this classification excluding banks and mercantile houses from
the penalty provisons of this chapter is arbitrary
and has no reasonable justification in fact. And
that it is therefore unconstitutional to that extent.~'
It is the contention of appellant that, while the problem before the court is similar to the Justice v. Standard
Gilson'ite case, the purpose of the act and the facts involved
in that case were quite different; furthermore there is no
showing or evidence herein that the Legislature was arbitrary in excluding the operations named in the statute presently under consideration.
The Smith v. Cahoon case, relied upon by respondent
in the court below, was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1931, and held the Florida Act regulating
motor carriers unconstitutional. Since that time it has been
the subject of critical examination in several decisions. The
facts of the case are that the appellant was a carrier for
hire who was arrested for operating without having obtained a certificate of convenience and necessity or having
paid the tax required by the laws of Florida. The statutes
provided that every auto transportation company must
obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity, a bond
or insurance policy must be given for protection of freight
carried and the public which might be injured through
negligent operation, and a mileage tax paid. From these
provisions, the statutes exempted certain carriers as follows:
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"* * * Provided, that the term 'auto transportation company' as used in this act shall not include corporations or persons engaged exclusively
in the transportation of children to or from school
* * * in the transporting agricultural, horticul-'
tural, dairy, or other farm products and fresh and
salt fish and oysters and shrimp from the point of
production to the assembling or shipping point enroute to primary market, * * * in transporting or delivering dairy products or any transportation company engaged in operating taxicabs, or hotel busses from a depot to a hotel in the same town
or city."
The facts in the instant case are distinguishable from
those in Smith v. Cahoon in that here the appellant holds a
certificate of convenience and necessity, and the Utah law
does not exempt any class of persons from the requirements
under the Motor Carrier Act relating to insurance, safety
regulations or accident reports. Also, the Utah Motor Carrier Act does not discriminate by imposing a mileage tax
on those having a certificate of convenience and necessity.
In its Smith

v.

Cahoon decision, the court said:

"* * * In the present instance, the regulation as to the giving of a bond or insurance policy
to protect the public generally, in order to be sustained, must be deemed to relate to the public safety.
This is a matter of grave concern as the highways
become increasingly crowded with motor vehicles,
and we entertain no doubt of the power of the state
to insist upon suitable protection for the public
against injuries through the operations on its highways of carriers for hire, whether they are common
carriers or private carriers. But in establishing
such a regulation, there does not appear to be the
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slightest justification for making a distinction between those who carry for hire farm products, or
milk or butter, or fish or oysters, and those who
carry for hire bread or sugar, or tea or coffee, or
groceries in general, or other useful commodities.
So far as the statute was designed to safeguard the
public with respect to the use of the highways, we
think that the discrimination it makes between the
private carriers which are relieved of the necessity
of obtaining certificates and giving security, and a
carrier such as the appellant, was wholly arbitrary
and constituted a violation of the appellant's constitutional right. 'Such a classification is not based
on anything having relation to the purpose for
which it is made.' * * *"
It is to be noted that in the first part of the above
statement, the court found that there was no valid reason
for distinguishing between classes of carriers with respect
to the requirement of a bond or insurance policy for the
protection of the public. Under the Utah law, no carrier
for hire is exempted from the insurance policy requirements.

As to the latter part of the above statement, the court
said that the statute was designed to protect the use of the
highways and that the exemption of private carriers was
arbitrary. It appears that the Utah Legislature had a
broader purpose in mind when it enacted the Utah Motor
Carrier Act than is indicated by the Florida statutes quoted
in Smith v. Cahoon. For example, Section 54-6-4, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, provides:
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counts, service and safety of operations of each
common motor carrier, to regulate operating and
time schedules so as to meet the needs of any community, and so as to insure adequate transportation
service to the territory traversed by such common
motor carriers, and so as to prevent unnecessary
duplication of service between these common motor
carriers, and between them and the lines of competing steam and electric railroads; and the commission
may require the coordination of the service and
schedules of competing common carriers by motor
vehicles or electric and steam railroads; * * * "
And Section 54-6-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides:

"* * * the commission shall take into consideration the financial ability of the applicant to
properly perform the service sought under the certificate and also the character of the highway over
which said common motor carrier proposes to operate and the effect thereon, and upon the traveling
public using the same, and also the existing transportation facilities in the territory proposed to be
served. * * *"
And, with respect to contract carriers, Section 54-6-8, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, provides:
"* * * If, * * * the commission shall
determine that the highways over which the applicant desires to operate are not unduly burdened;
that the granting of the application will not unduly
interfere with the traveling public; and that the
granting of the application will not be detrimental
to the best interests of the people of the state of
Utah and/or to the localities to be served, and if
the existing transportation facilities do not provide
adequate or reasonable service, the commission shall
grant such permit."
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From the foregoing, it can be seen that the Legislature
had much more in mind than merely the protection of the
highways and requiring a bond or insurance for the safety
of the public, and it may well have had these other factors
in mind whe-n it exempted certain carriers from some portions of the Motor Carrier Act.
It is also of no small consequence that Smith v. Cahoon has been the subject of critical examination in more

recent decisions. In the 1935 Wyoming decision of Public
Sl'rl'ire Commission of JVyoming v. W. C. Grimshaw, 53
P. 2d l, 109 A. L. R. 534, the Wyoming Supreme Court
said of the Smith v. Cahoon decision :
"The decision of Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S.
553, 51 S. Ct. 582, 75 L. Ed. 1264, relied upon by
the defendant, has had its legal effect repeatedly reviewed by the above cited later cases from the court
from which it emanated. See especially Aero May/loH•er T1·ansit Company v. Georgia Public Service
Commission, supra. In view of its subsequent interpretation by the national Supreme Court, we are
obliged to conclude that it cannot be regarded as
applicable here."
The United States Supreme Court in Aero Mayflower
T1·ans£t Company v. Georgia Public Service Commission,
295 U. S. :285, 79 L. Ed. 1439, analyzed Smith v. Cahoon as
follows:

"Smith v. Cahoon has been considered in later
cases in this court, and the limits of its holding,
clear enough at the beginning, have been brought
out in sharp relief. Thus, in Continental Baking
Co. v. Woodring, supra (286 U. S. 371, 76 L. Ed.
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1166, 52 S. Ct. 595, 81 A. L. R. 1402) which came
here from the State of Kansas, exemption from various forms of regulation, including the payment of
a tax, was accorded to 'the transportation of livestock and farm products to market by the owner
thereof or supplies for his own use in his own motor vehicle.' The exemption was upheld. Again, in
Hicklin V. Coney, supra (290 U. S. 175, 78 L. Ed.
251, 54 S. Ct. 142) a statute of South Carolina gave
exemption to 'farmers or dairymen, hauling dairy
or farm products; or lumber haulers engaged in
transporting lumber or logs from the forests to be
shipping points.' The exemption was interpreted by
the highest court of the state as limited to cases
where the hauling was irregular or occasional and
not as a regular business. We upheld the statute as
thus interpreted though the effect was to relieve
from the filing of a bond.
"These cases and others like them (American
Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 45 L. Ed.
102, 21 S. Ct. 43) are illustrations of the familiar
doctrine that a legislature has a wide discretion in
the classification of trades and occupations for the
purpose of taxation and in the allowance of exemptions and deductions within reasonable limits. Bell's
Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 33 L. Ed.
892, 10 S. Ct. 53; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217
U. S. 114, 125, 54 L. Ed. 688, 694, 30 S. Ct. 496;
Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 572,
54 L. Ed. 883, 30 S. Ct. 578; Stebbins v. Riley, 268
U. S. 137, 142, 69 L. Ed. 884, 888, 45 S. Ct. 424, 44
A. L. R. 1454; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S.
146, 159, 7 4 L. Ed. 775, 781, 50 S. Ct. 310; State
Tax Comrs. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 L. Ed.
1248, 51 S. Ct. 540, 73 A. L. R. 1464, 75 A. L. R.
1536."
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Refl•rt>ncc to cases in which Smith v. Cahoon has been
l'Onsidered indicates the restricted scope of that holding
and its inapplicability to the instant case. In the case of
Rail1cay Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 93
L. Ed. 533, the Supreme Court of the United States considered the constitutionality of a city regulation prohibiting advertising vehicles in city streets but permitting business notices upon business delivery vehicles under certain
specified conditions. In answering attacks upon the constitutionality of the ordinance, the court stated :
''* * * We do not sit to weigh evidence on
the due process issue in order to determine whether
the regulation is sound or appropiate; nor is it our
function to pass judgment on its wisdom. See Olsen
v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236, 85 L. Ed. 1305, 61 S.
Ct. 862, 133 A. L. R. 1500. We would be trespassing
on one of the most intensely local and specialized
of all municipal problems if we held that this regulation had no relation to the traffic problem of New
York City. It is the judgment of the local authorities that it does have such a relation. And nothing
has been advanced which shows that to be palpably
false.

"* * *
"We cannot say that that judgment is not an
allowable one. Yet if it is, the classification has
relation to the purpose for which it is made and
does not contain the kind of discrimination against
which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection. It is by such practical considerations based on
experience rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question of equal protection is to be
answered. * * * And the fact that New York
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City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of
distraction but does not touch what may be even
greater ones in a different category, such as the
vivid displays on Times Square, is immaterial. It
is no requirement of equal protection that all evils
of the same genius be eradicated or none at all.
Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157,
160, 57 L. Ed. 164, 169, 33 S. Ct. 66."
Recent expressions of the United States Supreme
Court, dealing with the question of classifications under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
include the Sunday Closing Law decisions: McGowan v.
Maryland, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393; Braunfeld v. Brown, 6 L. Ed.
2d 563; Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket, 6 L. Ed.
2d 536; and Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v.
McGinley, 6 L. Ed. 2d 551. In the 1961 McGowan case, the
Supreme Court of the United States, in sustaining the clas·
sifications under the Sunday Closing Law in question,
stated as follows :

"* * * Although no precise formula has
been developed, the Court has held that the Four·
teenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope
of discretion in enacting laws which affect some
groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that in practice,
their laws result in some inequality. A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. See
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comrs., 330 U.
S. 552, 91 L. Ed. 1093, 67 S. Ct. 910; Metropolitan
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Casuality Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 79 L.
Ed. 1070, 5i> S. Ct. 538; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 51 L. Ed. 369, 31 S. Ct.
337, Ann. Cas. 1912C 160; Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. Ed. 909, 19 S.
Ct. 609."

The separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined
by Mr. Justice Harlan in the McGowan decision, and all
of tht• other aforementioned Sunday Closing Law cases,
reads in part:

"* * * The restricted scope of this Court's
review of state regulatory legislation under the
Equal Protection Clause is of long standing. Lindsley v. Natural Carbon-ic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78,
79, 55 L. Ed. 369, 377, 378, 31 S. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas.
1912C 160. The applicable principles are that a
state statute may not be struck down as offensive
of equal protection in its schemes of classification
unless it is obviously arbitrary, and that, except in
the case of a statute whose discriminations are so
patently without reason that no conceivable situation of fact could be found to justify them, the
claimant who challenges the statute bears the burden of affirmative demonstration that in the actual
state of facts which surround its operation, its classification lacks rationality."
In addition to the Aero Mayflower Transit Company
V. Georgia Public Sen·ice Commission case, supra, see the
ft)llowing cases pertaining to exemptions in the transportation of livestock, dail·y, agricultural, and horticultural
products: Hicl.·lin v. Covey, 290 U. S. 169, 78 L. Ed. 247;
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76 L.
Ed. 1155: Bushnell v. People. 92 Colo. 174, 19 P. 2d 197;
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Schwartzman Service v. Stahl, 60 F. 2d 1034; Riley v. Lawson, 106 Fla. 521, 143 So. 619; State v. King, (Maine), 188
A. 775; Ex Parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 P. 2d 284;
Figenshaw V. McCoy, (N. D.), 265 N. W. 259; Wisconsin
Allied Truck Owners' Assoc. V. Public Service Commission,
207 Wis. 664, 242 N. W. 668.
With respect to the constitutionality of the exemptions
contained in Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
the court's attention is directed to the complete annotation
on this subject in 109 American Law Reports, Annotated,
550. Beginning on page 570, the annotation specifically
reviews most of the exemptions found in the Utah law.
These exemptions are traditional and most of them can be
found in the Interstate Commerce Act and in comparable
acts of almost every state in the Union.
Subsection (a) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, exempts motor vehicles engaged in transporting
students or their instructors to or from school or school
activities from the Motor Carrier Act. In Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 76 L. Ed. 1155, the
United States Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of a similar exemption, saying:
"The fourth exemption is 'of transportation of
children to and from school.' The distinct public
interest in this sort of transportation affords sufficient reason for the classification. The State was
not bound to seek revenue for its highways from
that source, and, without violating appellants' con-
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stiutional rights, could avail itself of other means
of assuring safety in that class of cases."
See Ex Parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 P. 2d 284;
v. Lawson, 106 Fla. 521, 143 So. 619; Kelly v. Finney,
:!07 Ind. 557, 194 N. E. 157.
Riley

Subsection (b) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, exempts motor vehicles engaged in carrying
mail under contract with the federal government from certain provisions of the Motor Carrier Act. This type of exemption has been held constitutional in a number of cases.
In Kelly v. Finney, supra, the court said:
"The exemption contained in subsection (b) of
section 2, which exempts motor vehicles used exclusively in carrying United States mail, is also
affected with the public interest, and can be sustained upon the same principles as the transportation of school children, and for that reason the classification is not invalid."
Also see Public Service Commission of Wyoming v.
Grimshan•, supra.
Subsection (c) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, exempts from certain provisions of the Utah
l\Iotor Carrier Act motor vehicles when the cargo consists
exclusively of livestock, farm, orchard, or dairy products
which are being transported between farm, orchard or
dairy and a market, warehouse, creamery or processing
plant; or exclusively of farm or dairy supplies used in or
about the farm or dairy; or exclusively of coal, lumber or
logs which are being transported from mine or forest to
shipping point or market.
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Attention is directed to the limitation imposed on the
transportation of the products named in Subsection (c),
above. Such products may not be transported just any
place the carrier desires.

In Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, supra, the United States Supreme Court
sustained the exemption of transportation of agricultural
or dairy products under a statute which provided whether
the "vehicle is owned by the owner or producer of such
agricultural or dairy products or not, so long as the title
remains in the producer." The court, in its opinion, quoted
from an earlier Georgia case, Nance v. Harrison, 176 Ga.
67 4, 169 S. E. 22, as follows:

"* * * Many of the farm products must be
brought from remote sections unaccommodated by
the better system of roads-in some cases not even
by a public road. * * *"
In Schwartzman Service, Inc., v. Stahl, et al., (Mo.
1932), 60 F. 2d 1034, the District Court, Western District
of Missouri, upheld an exemption similar to that in the Utah
law, saying:
"It must be conceded that the interest of the
public is involved in the gathering and marketing
of farm products as speedily and economically as
possible. The Legislature no doubt had in mind the
facts, the same as have been made to appear to us,
that the only use made by trucks within the exemption would be in gathering the products of the
farmer and transporting them to the nearest shipping point.
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"Necessarily, this would not involve an extensive use of the highways. In a few instances,
no doubt the farmer would live on the state owned
and controlled highway, but in most instances this
would not be true. In the majority of cases the
farmers first reach the state highways at the place
of marketing their products. In such cases they
would not use state highways at all. The highways
would not be used by the farmer in marketing his
product as much as the contract hauler and motor
carrier would use the same highways within cities
and suburban zones. Moreover long hauls could not
be economically made under this exemption. The
motor vehicle employed must return empty, as farm
products could not be hauled both ways to market.
Again, large heavy trucks could not be used in gathering farm products. Much of the time such trucks
would be off of hard surfaced roads.
"Plaintiff relies upon the late case of Smith v.
Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 51 S. Ct. 582, 587, 75 L. Ed.
1264. While the exemption in that case was in language very similar to the language in the case at
bar, yet it contained this broad exemption, 'or to
motor vehicles used exclusively in transporting or
delivering dairy products.'
"It will be observed that this might involve
long hauls over the highways and does not restrict
deliveries merely for shipping purposes. The same
could be used for hauling both ways."

Also see Figensha'W v. McCoy (N. D.), 265 N. W. 259;
State ex rel. Wisconsin All-ied Truck O'Wners' Assoc. v. Public Sen·ice Commission. 207 \Vis. 664, 242 N. W. 668; Riley
v. Lau·sMz. supra.
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With regard to the exemption for the transportation
of coal, lumber or logs, it is to be noted that such transportation is restricted to hauling from the mine or forest to
the shipping point or market. The Supreme Court of Oregon sustained a similar exemption for the transportation
of logs, poles, piling or rough timber in the case of Anderson v. Thomas, Commissioner of Public Utilities, 26 P. 2d
60, 75, saying:

"* * * The lumbering business is one of the
principal industries of the state, on which a large
part of the population is dependent, and the state
is interested in encouraging and developing this industry. Moreover, the commodity which is carried
by the special carrier might not, in the opinion of
the Legislature, be able to bear so large a tax as
commodities ordinarily carried by the contract
hauler."
Also see State v. King, supra; Hicklin v. Covey, 290
U. S. 169, 78 L. Ed. 247, 54 S. Ct. 142.
The transportation of coal from the mine to shipping
point or market would be analogous to the hauling of logs
and agricultural products. The mines are usually not located adjacent to state highways, so that use of such highways is limited. It is also suggested that, in conjunction
with this, the Legislature may have considered the economic importance of the coal industry to certain areas of
our state and felt that its regulation to the same extent as
other carriers would not be in the public interest.
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Subsection (d) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotakd 1953. exempts vehicles operated by agricultural cooperative associations in their nonprofit activities.
In 1\.elly v. Finn('y, supra, the court held constitutional
a statute which exempted from the act regulating motor
rarriers '' * * * vehicles transporting livestock, farm
or dairy products or supplies from or to farm or dairy or
from point of production to market warehouse, creamery
or other original place of storage, or to or from any distribution depot owned, operated or controlled by any nonprofit cooperative association when vehicle (is) owned,
lt'ased or operated by a non-profit cooperative association
(and/or) when transporting property of the association or,
of any of its members, * * *." The court said :
"* * * The Legislature knew that the use
of the state highways for the transportation of livestock or farm or dairy products, etc., coming within
the exemption is relatively small and incidental, and
is also affected with a general public interest, and
such classification, we think, is entirely permissible.

* * *"
And, in Baker v. Glenn, State Tax Commission of Kentucky (1933 D. C.), 2 F. Supp. 880, the court considered an
exemption for motor vehicles owned or leased by a nonprofit, cooperative association, from an act regulating motor
transportation, concluding:

"* * * The article in question provides that
a motor vehicle owned or leased by a nonprofit, cooperative, association, and carrying only property
belonging to the association or its members, 'shall
be considered to be an owner's truck,' as in fact it
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seems to us, in a very true sense, to be. These associations are really a banding together of numerous individuals engaged in the same business for
their common good. The enterprise is a joint one,
usually limited to the producers of agricultural products. The analogy between transportation by such
associations, and the transportation by a farmer of
his own livestock and farm products to market, is
so close, both in respect of frequency and character
of use, as to make applicable, we think, the distinction stated in Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring,
supra, at pages 371, 372, :373, of 286 U. S., 52 S.
Ct. 595. * * *"
Subsection (e) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, exempts motor vehicles used exclusively in the
transportation of newspapers from the publisher to subscribers or distributors.
The basis for upholding the exemption for the transportation of newspapers was well stated by the Supreme
Court of Indiana in Kelly v. Finney, et al., supra, as follows:
"Subsection (e) of section 2 exempts motor
vehicles used exclusively in the transportation of
newspapers from the publisher to the subscriber or
distributor. Here again the public interest is involved. Newspapers are read almost universally,
and form a very important part of our educational
and business life. The general public is interested
in rapid, frequent and cheap distribution of newspapers. No other type of transportation under modern and present day conditions would suffice, and
the exemption of such transportation could well be
made by legislative enactment in aid of this general
public policy."
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Also see SchwaTtzman Service v. Stahl, supra; State

v.

J\ing, supra.

Subsections (f) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotalt1d 1953, exempts from the Utah Motor Carrier Act vehicleg constructed for towing, wrecking, maintenance, or
repair purp<lSt>s; armored cars; hearses, ambulances, or licen~L'd taxicabs operating within a fifteen mile radius of
a city or town; and vehicles used incidentally as ambulances
or hearses by a licensed embalmer, funeral director or
mortuary.
The Legislature, no doubt, felt that the public welfare
would be better served by exempting these special type vehicles from a portion of the regulations imposed on other
motor carriers.
Attention is directed to the Nevada case of Ex Parte
lratacable, supra, in which several similar exemptions were
considered. The court said :
"The first class of motor vehicle claimed to be
exempted under the statute, * * * are hearses.
* * * \V e must presume that the Legislature
knew that cemeteries adjacent to cities are reached
by traversing chiefly streets and highways not embraced in the public highway system, and that the
use of public highways by hearses is rare; whereas,
this petitioner, comparatively speaking, to use the
language in Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring,
supra, uses daily upon the public highways a fleet
of trucks in the conduct of their businesses.
"The next class * * * are ambulances.
Again we think the Legislature must be presumed
to know that of our 90,000 population approximately
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70,000 reside in the towns and cities exceeding 400
in population, where the hospitals are located, not
requiring the use of the public highways to reach
them, and that the population scattered in the remote regions without telephone connections can take
an injured person to a hospital in the same length
of time it would take to go for an ambulance. * * *

"* * *

"The next class * * * are city licensed
taxicabs operating within a ten-mile limit of a city
or town. * * * the land two or three mlies beyond the city limits of substantially all the cities
and towns is arid and overgrown with sagebrush,
that the population beyond such a point is scattered,
and that the calls for taxicabs out to such localities
are rare; and, furthermore, that beyond the city
limits, in many instances, roads lead from such city
which are not a part of the public highway system,
* * *. They have a right, too, to take into consideration the fact that taxicabs are light and do
practically no damage to the public highways, while,
on the other hand, the trucks to which are often attached heavy trailers, are in constant use and do a
great deal of damage thereto."
In Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, supra, at page
1165 in 76 L. Ed., the court held that it was within the
broad discretion of the Legislature to exempt motor vehicles
operating within a radius of twenty-five miles from the
city in which their operations were carried on.
Also see Bacon Service Corporation v. Huss, 199 Cal.
21, 248 Pac. 235.
Subsection (g) of Section 54-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, exempts employees riding together to and from
work and sharing transportation expenses.
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Obviously this exemption is in the public interest.
Workers frequently live long distances from their place
of trnployment and public transportation is not always
availabl('. The effect of this exemption would actually be to
reduce traffic on the highways. Also, the expenses shared
must be actual expenses, and no individual may operate
more than one vehicle under the provisions of this statute,
so this is not a profit making type of operation.
In conclusion, appellants contend that there is a reasonable basis for the exemptions in the Utah Motor Carrier
Act, and that similar classifications considered by other
courts, both federal and state, have consistently been held
constitutional. The Utah law appears to be more restrictive
than similar laws in some of the other states in that it does
not completely exempt any carriers from the law. Those
that are exempted are still required to comply with the
insurance provisions of the act, the safety regulations, and
the accident reporting provisions. Furthermore, Section
:14-6-12 provides that the Public Service Commission may
prescribe reasonable rules to carry out the provisions of
the act, including the establishment of reasonable fees for
registration and services performed by the Commission.
Exempt carriers are also subject to the penalty provisions
of the ~Iotor Carrier Act.
It appears, therefore, that the exemptions are consistent with the purposes of the Utah Motor Carrier Act.
In many states the acts regulating motor transportation
provide for taxes for the maintenance of the public highways. This is not so in the Utah law. Here the objective
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is to regulate motor transportation so that the highways
and traveling public will be protected, that adequate service will be provided, that reasonable fares will be charged,
and that existing transportation facilities will not be unduly interfered with. Exempt carriers are not relieved of
the burden of paying their fair share of highway costs, but
rather, the Legislature, in what it believed to be in the
best interests of the public, relieved them of a portion of
the duties placed on motor carriers. The motor carriers
falling within the exemptions in Section 54-6-12 are engaged in types of business distinct and different from those
not exempted, and the exemptions were reasonably calculated to carry out the objectives of the Utah Motor Carrier
Act. As this court said, in Thomas v. Daughters of the
Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 Pac. (2d) 477, 499:

"* * * If by any fair interpretation of the
statute the legislation can be upheld, it is the duty
of this court to sustain it, even though judges may
view the act as inopportune or unwise; and it is not
within the province of the judiciary to question the
wisdom or the motives of the Legislature in the
enactment of a statute."
POINT IV.
A FINDING THAT A PORTION OF THE UTAH
MOTOR CARRIER ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL DOES NOT RENDER THE ENTIRE
ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
This court has long recognized the rule that a portion
of a statute may be found unconstitutional without affect-
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ing the constitutionality of the remainder of the statute.
State v. Lf'dkins, 5 Utah 2d 422, 303 P. 2d 1099; North
Tintic Mining Co. v. Crockett, 75 Utah 259, 284 Pac. 328;
Statr ex rd. Shields v. Barke1·, 50 Utah 189, 167 Pac. 262;
Tygesf'n v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 274, 226 P. 2d 127;
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dist., 106 Utah
55, Ufl P. 2d 503. The rule summarized, as follows, in
Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 211 P. 2d 190:
"Severability or separability where part of a
statute is unconstitutional, is primarily a matter of
legislative intent. The test fundamentally is whether
the legislature would have passed the statute without the objectionable part, and whether or not the
parts are so dependent upon each other that the
court should conclude the intention was that the
statute be effective only in its entirety. * * *
Frequently the courts are aided in the determination
of legislative intent by the inclusion within a statute of a 'saving clause.' * * *"
This cout·t has also said that a savings clause creates
a presumption of separability, but such a presumption is
not controlling if it is recognizable that the Legislature
would not have enacted the remaining provisions alone,
or that standing alone they would not provide for an operative whole. State v. Roberts, 92 Utah 204, 66 P. 2d 892, In
tf Kt~sler, (D. C. Utah), 187 F. Supp. 277.
There is nothing in the record of the case before the
cout't showing the intention of the Legislature with respect
to the exemptions in Section 54-6-12. However, on pages 21
and 22 of this brief there is set forth portions of the statutes
which indicate the broad purposes of the Utah Motor Car-
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rier Act. The intention of the Legislature is further shown
by the savings clause contained in Section 25 of Chapter
65, Laws of Utah 1935, which set up the Utah Motor Carier Act in its present form, although some provisions have
since been amended. Said Section 25 reads as follows:
"If any part or parts of this act shall be held to
be constitutional, such decision shall not affect the
validity of the remaining parts of this act. The legislature hereby declares that it would have passed
the remaining parts of this act even if it had known
that such part or parts thereof would be declared
unconstitutional.''

The court below held the entire Utah Motor Carrier
Act unconstitutional on the basis that the exemptions in
Section 54-6-12 violated the provisions of both the State
and Federal Constitutions. It is our contention, however,
that even if this section should be found to be unconstitutional, the remainder of the Act should not fall. The legislature stated its intention in this regard in the savings
clause quoted above. Furthermore, the basic objectives of
the Act would remain intact. The unconstitutionality of
Section 54-6-12 would not render the remainder of the Act
inoperative. While the Legislature undoubtedly intended,
in the public interest, to relieve the exempt motor carriers
from some of the regulations and obligations imposed on
others, it is certainly questionable that the Legislature
would not have enacted the Motor Carrier Act and would
have let all motor carriers go unregulated simply because
certain classes couldn't be exempted.
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Appellants have cited cases in this brief in which
nearly all of the exemptions provided in Section 54-6-12
have been held constitutional by other courts. It is appellants' further contention, however, that if there is a portion of Section G·i-6-12 that is invalid, not all of that section
need be unconstitutional. In volume 2 of Sutherland, Statltfory Construction, page 195, it is stated:
"Recognition of a third separability situation in
which a single section of a statute contains the language susceptible of applications, part of which are
invalid, is important as the statute should be upheld even in the stricter jurisdictions, if, after the
physical deletion of the offending section, a workable statute, reasonably conforming to legislative intent, remains. * * *"
In the case of Fm·mers' Loan and Trust Co. v. New
York Cent. R. R., 134 Misc. 778, 236 N. Y. Supp. 250, the
court said:
"Where a part of a statute is unconstitutional,
that fact does not authorize the courts to declare
the remainder void, unless the provisions are so
connected together in subject-matter, meaning, or
purpose, that it cannot be presumed the Legislature
would have passed one without the other. * * *
If the remaining provision is complete in itself and
capable and being executed in accordance with the
apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of
that which was rejected, it must be sustained.

* * *
'·Even where a single section attempts or purports to cover two entirely distinct and separable
classes of cases, one properly and the other improperly, it may be upheld as to the class which consti-
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tutionally may be thus covered, even though condemned as to the other. Dollar Co. v. Canadian Car
& Foundry Co., 220 N. Y. 270, 278, 115 N. E. 711.
In such a case, the statute can be held entirely void
only where it is evident from a contemplation of the
statute and of the purpose to be accomplished by it
that it would not have been passed at all, except as
an entirety, and that the general purpose of the
Legislature will be defeated if it shall be held valid
as to some cases and void as to others. * * *
The principle governing division is not a principle
of form. It is a principle of function. The question
in every case is whether the Legislature, if partial
invalidity had been foreseen, would have wished the
statute to be enforced with the invalid part exscinded, or rejected altogether. * * *"
The court's attention is directed to the case of Justice
v. Standard Gilsonite Company, supra, in which it held only
the exclusionary provisions of the Utah statute relating to
banks and mercantile houses unconstitutional, saying:
"* * * so we conclude that this classification excluding banks and mercantile houses from
the penalty provisions of this chapter is arbitrary
and has no reasonable justification in fact and it
is, therefore, unconstitutional to that extent."

Respondents contend that if the exemptions contained
in Section 54-6-12 are found to be arbitrary and discrimina·
tory the entire Motor Carrier Act must fall. It is the position of appellants, in view of the foregoing cases and text
citations, that even if Section 54-6-12 should be found un·
constitutional, said section is completely severable and the
remainder of the Act should rest undisturbed. Also, appelants maintain that, while there has been no showing to
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date that any particular class exemption under Section
r)4-6-l~ violates the state or federal constitutional provisit~ns. if any particular exemption or exemptions are found
invalid, not all of Section 54-6-12 need be unconstitutional.
It is clear, in this situation, that the Legislature would
have passed the Act without all of the exemptions now contained in Section 54-6-12, as this section has been amended
spwral times. For example, prior to the 1945 amendment
(Chapter 105, Laws of Utah 1945), contract carriers operating within 15 miles of the corporate limits of a city or
town were exempt; the 1948 amendment (Chapter 8, Laws
of Utah 1948 First Special Session) added what is now
subst•dion (g). exempting employees riding together; the
19:-)7 amendment (Chapter 107, Laws of Utah 1957) added
the paragraphs relating to insurance on, and regulation of,
exempt carriers; the 1961 amendment (Chapter 125, Laws
of Utah 1961) added the hauling of coal to the exempt
classes.
In summary, it is the position of appellants that Section 54-6-12 is severable from the other provisions of the
Utah Jlntor Carrier Act, and if the court should find that
Sedion i)-l-6-12 violates the constitutional provisions complained of, the remainder of the Act should stand. Furthermore, if the court should find that any specific exemption in Section 5-!-6-12 is unconstitutional, the remaining
portions of said section should rest undisturbed.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent comes before the court in an inconsistent
position. It holds certificates of convenience and necessity,
and during the pendency of this case has applied for additional authority. For years respondent has enjoyed, and
still does enjoy, the benefits of regulation under the Motor
Carrier Act, and, therefore, is estopped from challenging
the constitutionality of said Act.
The exemptions which respondent claims are repugnant to the Federal and State Constitutions are similar to
those found in Federal and State laws throughout the nation and have been regularly upheld in the courts.
Appellants maintain that the Motor Carrier Act is
constitutional and consistent with public policy and respectfully request this court to reverse the judgment of the
court below.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General,
H. WRIGHT VOLKER,
Assistant Attorney General,
KEITH E. SOHM,
Commerce Attorney,

Attorneys for Appelktnts.
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